TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- REPORT 1 JULY 1993 FINAL [BIWEEKLY] REPORT

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

REPORT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

BIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

Special Report for 1 July 1993

1. PURPOSE: This special edition of the Task Force Russia (TFR) Biweekly Report marks the transfer of TFR from the U.S. Army to the Department of Defense. This time the focus of the report is not on the brief look back at TFR offered immediately below, but on the annexes. Annex A is the Director's Overview, MG Loeffke's farewell insights on working with the Russians. Annex B schematically depicts TFR's organization and Annex C records all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilians who have been a part of the task force over the past year. Finally, Annex D offers a summary to date of pertinent operational statistics. This is the twenty-fourth Biweekly Report and TFR hopes that, when all twenty-four are taken together, they will offer a fair record of the efforts undertaken under Army auspices in the search for those unaccounted-for service members who are missing, but not forgotten.

2. Although some ad hoc work had been done in the preceding months, TFR's official birthdate was 29 June 1992. At that stage, the task force consisted of one dramatically-overworked Army colonel and a changing handful of subordinates he had cajoled from various agencies on a temporary basis. The task force had several priorities to deal with simultaneously--build a functional organization, support Ambassador Toon and the Joint Commission, answer queries from Congress, and translate and rapidly evaluate several hundred pages of Russian-language documents. TFR had a temporary home in one room of a Pentagon suite of offices--with no dedicated automation. There was also no institutional knowledge on which to draw about the POW/MIA issue in relation to the former Soviet Union.

3. The Army and Army agencies, the Air Force and the Navy responded to the call for personnel. In many cases, individuals were requested on a by-name basis due to their expertise vis-a-vis the Russians. By late August, the newly-arriving analytical, translation, and automation specialists had a suite of offices in the Hoffman Building, working on borrowed word processors while awaiting the delivery of modern computers which could be netted together.

4. Although the basic complement of personnel had extensive Russian-language skills and analytical

backgrounds, the POW/MIA issue was, by and large, an unknown area. The learning curve was markedly steep as analysts used to assessing war plans or force structure learned about the GULag and U.S. archival records-keeping procedures. Initial obstacles involved assessing what was known in both the public and private sectors and learning how to gain access to information--much of which had been buried in the archives for decades. A great deal of effort during the first months of the task force's existence went to re-learning information that the U.S. Government had known decades before but had forgotten. Again and again, analysts followed leads to retired officers or obscure records only to find that the man's testimony or the record's data had been worked through years before by other hands seeking to prove that U.S. service members had been transferred to the former Soviet Union from Vietnam or Korea the Cold War or World War II.

5. Consistently, direct help and useful leads came from POW/MIA family members. TFR pledged early on to listen to their cases and to do all that could honestly be done to help reduce their uncertainty and distrust. In return, many family members gave selflessly of their time, knowledge and resources to assist the task force as it struggled to build a solid base of knowledge from which it could operate effectively with its Russian counterparts.

6. In September 92, again in December, then in April 93, TFR supported Ambassador Toon and the U.S. side of the Joint Commission in plenary sessions with the Russians. In a very direct sense, the task force's progress as an organization could be measured in the dramatic improvements in support offered the U.S. side in each successive joint session. Also, in November, the task force supported the Senate hearings on POW/MIA affairs.

7. From the beginning, TFR pledged itself to operating at the unclassified level to the maximum extent possible. The only exceptions to this were when other agencies classified source documents (which TFR often sought to have declassified) or when a higher authority directed the classification of a particular matter or detail due to security requirements for ongoing operations. Overall, very little work remained classified, and well in excess of 95% of the task force's activities are recorded in its unclassified Biweekly Reports. In the course of producing these reports and related analytical papers, the task force was cognizant of the need to adequately record its actions and analyses for successor organizations to build upon, but also to share with the American people the often mundane, but always dedicated efforts made on their behalf and on behalf of the missing. TFR translations of thousands of pages of documents acquired from the Russian side are also available at the unclassified level.

8. Although TFR was structured around a core of regular officers and Department of the Army civilians, much of its strength had to be drawn from the reserve components. Without exception, all of these officers and enlisted soldiers served well; however, active duty time constraints on the reservists meant that TFR had a nearly-constant flux of personnel. Thus, the regulars were used to provide continuity, while the reservists were generally employed for highly-specific tasks, ranging from legal research to specialized translations.

9. Parallel to the development of the base task force in the Washington area, a smaller team coalesced in Moscow. Based in the U.S. Embassy, Task Force Russia-Moscow (TFR-M) really made up the heart of the U.S. effort to investigate the allegations that U.S. service members had been transferred to the former Soviet Union and to attempt to identify any such individuals. TFR-M, normally staffed with eight to ten officers and enlisted administrative assistants, constantly deployed team members to the remote regions of Russia and other newly-emerged states that had hosted GULAG sites. TFR-M literally traveled the length and breadth of the former Soviet Union, interviewing hundreds of Russian officials, citizens, officers and GULAG veterans. To the extent that TFR has pieced together a coherent picture of what may have happened as regards U.S. service members taken to the former Soviet Union, TFR-M is responsible. While archival research, interviews, translations and analysis by the parent organization in Washington helped fill in the details, without the work of the skilled linguists on the ground in Moscow, TFR would have made little progress.

10. As TFR members rapidly gained expertise over the months, an increasingly clear picture of what may have happened on the prisoner transfer issue emerged. That picture is recorded elsewhere in TFR

products. All that need be said here is that, although daily progress often seemed painfully slow or non-existent, across its year of existence, TFR developed a depth of knowledge and objective analysis in its area of responsibility that is respected by concerned citizens and family members. At present, the work of the task force continues, and only the organization's administrative status has changed. TFR still deploys investigative teams throughout the former Soviet Union and around the world, as necessary. Research and analysis continue relentlessly. We are still here, in service to our missing.

ANNEX A TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 29 MAY-- 11 JUNE 1993

SUBJECT: Director's Overview (MG Bernard Loeffke)

July of 1993 concludes my year of service as Director, Task Force-Russia, as well as ending my thirty-five-year military career. On this occasion I have taken the liberty of sharing some thoughts on Russia that I have developed since first I became involved with Russians. My goal is not to record a piece of history--the men and women of Task Force-Russia have already done a fine job of that--but to communicate a vision of Russia and its people in a troubled time.

The first point I need to make--and I've tried to make it elsewhere in the past--is that there isn't just one "Russia." There are a number of "Russias" layered on top of each other, bumping against each other's sides, intermingling--and sometimes struggling against each other. I am always wary of anyone who proclaims that "Russia" fits into one mold or another. For virtually every conclusion I have drawn about Russia in the past I eventually found contradictory evidence. It is a country as vast as it is often provincial, rich and painfully poor, ingenious, creative--and exasperatingly inept. I count some Russians--former enemies of my country--among my friends today, while there are others I shall never be able to trust. I admire the courage and honor of certain Russians, even as I and my colleagues have had to deal with the duplicity of others. Russia is a vision that is always just receding, so enormous it is impossible to take in at a single look. If Western experts on Russia often take positions diametrically opposed to one another, I have learned to accept the fact that each expert may be right according to his/her experience.

The military reform conference, which I attended in May 1993, offered a microcosm of several of the "Russias" with which we presently must deal. In addition to international guests from the USA, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and elsewhere, there were Russian participants from both the military and the civilian arms of government. Old warhorse generals struggled to cope with a changed world, while it was clear that other senior officers had adapted to the new rules with startling facility. There were old-fashioned "apparatchiki" and bright young officials difficult to distinguish from their Western counterparts, veterans of the GULAG and Orthodox fundamentalists, as well as the "Slavophiles" and "Westernizers" whose debate has echoed through the past three centuries of Russian thought. I will highlight a few of the exchanges in which I participated or which I observed.

Russians from various backgrounds, officers as well as parliamentarians, repeatedly stressed to me and my assistant that the U.S. POW/MIA issue is "dead." The most common reason given for the lack of Russian interest in this issue was the overwhelming problems the Russians themselves face--problems that, in their view, are far more important than the issue of the fates of a few dozen or a few hundred--or even a few thousand--missing American service members. I found the Russians respectful of our quest, clearly associating our concern with the fates of men so long missing with our more humanitarian approach to the individual and his or her worth. They felt they could learn from us in this area. But they also feel they have more pressing problems. Another reason given for the relative lack of progress on the POW/MIA issue was that "Russia lost tens of millions--and we don't know what happened to millions of them." A Russian might grow suddenly emotional, offering that his own father was purged by Stalin, or served time in a camp in the Arctic Circle. Statistically, our losses appear inconsequential to them. Yet, I feel that the greatest reason for a lack of commitment to solving the problem of the fates of U.S. POW/MIAs who were held in the Soviet camp system is at once more immediate and more superficial: this issue does not, at present, figure as a priority for President Yeltsin. I believe that, unless the highest levels of the U.S. Government re-energize this issue, we may never gain all of the answers that I am convinced lie in the archives of the Russian security services and in the memories of participants. While

we have made remarkable progress in piecing together a part of this hidden history of the past fifty years, we may not be able to go much further unless we can re-kindle some passion in Russian hearts, or, at least, some enlightened self-interest in Russian minds on this issue.

If the Russians have lost interest in the POW/MIA issue, what does interest them? The answer is clear: nuclear issues. The Chernobyl accident exploded many illusions Russian military men and civilians held about nuclear weapons, making the impossibility of surviving a nuclear attack painfully clear. In May of 1993 I met a Russian general who is dying of cancer as a consequence of his participation in rescue operations during the Chernobyl incident. He told me that many of his soldiers have also been stricken. During the Humanitarian Conference, I sat next to a Russian parliamentarian responsible for defense matters. When asked what his top priority would be if he were to become Defense Minister, he answered without hesitation, "Nuclear weapons." He went on to say that the problem of nuclear weapons is foremost in the minds of many Russian strategic thinkers, specifically--how are these weapons to be effectively controlled and how can nuclear exchanges be prevented? But the nuclear issue is not one-sided. While addressing the graduating class at a high-level Russian academy, I mentioned that the Russians still have the nuclear capability to destroy us in thirty minutes. A Russian colonel responded, "And so do you, General, so do you.

The Russian response to foreign participants at the conference was instructive. It was clear that the Russians felt closest to and got along best with the Americans. Part of this has to do with that long-suppressed fascination with things American, part with the discovery of the humanity of the old "enemy number one." Perhaps we also share something in the largeness of our spirits and our native lands, in our often emotional approach to life. I do not mean to imply that the Russians did not get along well with our European allies--only that there seemed to be a special bond between Russians and Americans. Yet it is not a bond so strong that it could not be easily broken. We must do as much as we rationally can to strengthen this bond, to disarm Russian insecurities and develop a genuine understanding of America's hopes for Russia. In my service, on four continents, I have found that there is no substitute for personal diplomacy, for broad and repeated human contacts, in building trust. Personal relationships create strategies. We simply need to spend a lot more time with the Russians, and to give their young officers and officials, their students and professionals, many more opportunities to see us and our country up close. The most powerful tool I know for peace and understanding is direct human contact.

A Russian admiral gave me evidence of this. In the course of the informal after-hours get-togethers during the conference, I brought him together with a U.S. Army NCO. The Russian's image of the American NCO was old Hollywood--vulgar, rude, uneducated, and stony-hearted. The NCO, with whom the admiral spoke for almost two hours, was well-educated and crisp-spoken, professional and dedicated to the Army and to caring for soldiers. Speaking alone with the admiral afterward, I became convinced that that single meeting had profoundly changed the admiral's understanding--and it definitely made him realize how badly the lack of a solid NCO corps hurts his own military establishment. He told me, "If we had sergeants like yours, we wouldn't need young officers like ours." Perhaps, in the course of the multiplying exchanges with the Russians, we should send fewer generals and more sergeants to meet with Russians. Certainly, we should send more young representatives who can interact easily with Russians of their own rank and generation. The future belongs to today's sergeants, lieutenants and majors. We need to develop this type of relationship between those who will shape our future. I recently witnessed a fine example of this sort of exchange when six Russian military cadets visited me in the Pentagon. Their visit to the U.S. had been sponsored by a non-governmental organization with military ties and they stayed with military families as they traveled around America. The cadets were enthusiastic and felt they had seen the true America, since families can't hide things and children's responses are unrehearsed. These future leaders are taking home a much healthier and more positive view of our country than they held a few months ago.

I found it instructive to be an outsider looking in on the Russian efforts at reform. Often, the Russians remain prisoners of their experiences, comfortable with the old ways of doing things. For instance, Russian commanders grew comfortable having a political officer around to "babysit" their soldiers and to interpret the world and the commander's requirements. For a time, it appeared that the political officer would be jettisoned; now, however, the Russians are working to field a "Deputy Commander for

Personnel" in units--who will have many of the same responsibilities as the old political officer, keeping the commander removed from the problems of his soldiers. When I mentioned that, in our Army, commanders are responsible personally for communicating the mission, their vision of how to accomplish it, unit goals and world events to their soldiers, the Russians responded that their commanders were already busy and that they felt a Deputy for Personnel could better handle such matters.

I had been in Moscow a month earlier attending a conference on the role of religion in the Russian Army. Considerable debate focused on the role of military chaplains and the chaplain serving as a replacement for the political officer. One of my first questions on this later trip was, "What's been decided on the creation of a chaplaincy for the military?" The answer was, "We are not quite ready for military chaplains and, anyway, there are not enough priests to satisfy the needs of the civilian communities."

One of the dangers Russia faces is that capitalism without spiritual or moral values may not be any better than the system it is attempting to replace.

The greatest influence in my life was a young soldier in Vietnam who helped me look at my profession differently. Larry Morford was one of the most thoughtful persons I have known. He did not believe in war as a way of resolving conflicts. He did not believe the U.S. belonged in Vietnam. Yet he also felt that he could not remain home while others were fighting his country's wars. I once asked him why he had volunteered for an Infantry unit and had then refused a safer job after ten months in combat. He told me, "Sir, the job you and I are doing is the job of a beast-- and the least beastly of us should be doing it." Larry was killed a few days before he was to return home. Only taught spiritual and moral values can produce a human being like Larry.

I shared this story with my Russian colleagues and I hope it helped them understand the kind of man many of us think makes a truly good soldier.

Many of the Russians I know are confused. A Moscow scholar remarked to me, "We don't know what we should be ashamed of and what to be proud of." An officer at one of the academies asked me, "Do we throw out everything from the old system? Was all of it bad?"

One aspect in which Russians are very different from Americans became immediately apparent at the conference. The stated purpose of our get togethers was to assist in forming innovative approaches to "humanizing" conditions in the Russian military and to further reform. But, whereas our approach to these problems would be practical--"show me what works"--the Russian approach was almost absurdly theoretical. The Russians who delivered papers and led seminars all seemed to be obsessed with the need to construct detailed models and a perfect all-encompassing theory *first*, and only then, after everything had been plotted and planned in detail, to begin fixing the very real and pressing problems the Russian military faces. The Russian love for theory goes back a long way, but, under the circumstances, it's beginning to look like an addiction. All of the rhetoric and theory that destroyed the Soviet economy and Soviet society is still having a hangover effect, and responsible men and women are afraid to make a move until the theoretical underpinnings have been firmly established and agreed upon. While the Russian penchant for pure theory touches most sectors of society in some way, the military's preoccupation with constructing "unified field theories" before reacting to the rising floodwaters is crippling to them. Most likely, commanders out in the troubled hinterlands will, given the press of events, come up with practical solutions while the theoreticians in Moscow dither, but, if Russian history is a precedent, the theoreticians may have their way in the end--despite empirical data from the field that would seem to prove them wrong. We cannot affect this--the mental mechanics of Marxism-Leninism are too deeply-embedded in the power-holding generation, even though the ideas themselves have been washed away. Until a new, more mentally-agile generation takes control, we will simply have to watch the Russians as they add to their agony by attempting to encase real life in academic models.

During the conference period, I was privileged to be a guest lecturer at two important Russian military institutions, the Humanitarian Academy (which used to be the military's academy for turning out political officers) and the Frunze Academy (the Russian military's closest equivalent to our Command and General Staff College). While I had a few very specific points I wanted to put across to the Russian military's

"best and brightest," in the end I found the questions from the audience the most interesting part of the sessions.

Both of the lectures I presented were in Russian and sought to tear down walls. Speaking of barriers to understanding, I identified three: culture, language, and the limits of individual experience. I then spoke of my own experiences as an officer and commander in nation-building in the Third World and in helping nations build or strengthen democratic institutions. The role of the officer in a democratic state, and inter-rank relationships and responsibilities within the military also figured in the talks. My intent, however, was to loosen them up, to break these officers out of the formal, dry lecture system to which they have become accustomed, and to give them the opportunity to ask blunt questions of a U.S. Army general. At both academies the pattern was the same: following an initial period of hesitancy, the officers suddenly found they had so many questions that I couldn't address them all. In the differences column, however, I have to note that the questions asked at the Humanitarian Academy were at least slightly sharper and better-focused than those asked at the general staff academy. I think this is important because it's another indicator of how much talent was misused in the Soviet system. These bright, capable officers, instead of serving in immediately useful field roles, had made their careers as ideological watchdogs and "boy Fridays." Certainly, the officers at the Frunze Academy were impressive. But the concentration of wasted talent at the former political academy was striking.

Among the questions asked at the Humanitarian Academy, one relates directly to the "quest for the unified field theory" described above. An officer stood up boldly and asked me, "Who do you consider your main opponent now?" I told him I'd do my best to answer that, but that, since I was the guest, I felt he should first answer his own question--who did he feel was his country's number one threat today? The officer became flustered, finally stammering out helplessly, "Mr. General, I can't answer that yet-- our new doctrine hasn't been published. How can I know who our enemy is before the doctrine's been formulated?" While this answer appears laughable to us, it didn't seem comical at all to his peers. On one level, these bright future generals were simply sitting there waiting for somebody above them to define the threat. I later asked how many of them honestly still considered the U.S. the number one threat. Seven officers out of a few hundred finally raised their hands. My distinct feeling was that many of the others were simply being polite. While I don't want to engage in cheap psychology, I have repeatedly witnessed this sort of "negative capability" in Russians, the ability to simultaneously hold two contradictory views. On one hand, the officers believed that they were waiting for the threat to be redefined, but, on the other, the atmosphere in the lecture hall suggested to me that they believed the old "American threat" wasn't really gone yet. Evidence for this was not long in emerging. Officers began asking questions as to why Soviet fleets were virtually disappearing, while U.S. fleets still maintained "threatening postures." They had seen the partial breakdown of their own military first-hand, but they seemed to have no sense of the depth of the already- accomplished U.S. force cuts. Perhaps this image of shallower U.S. cuts was created by the fact that we have better-managed our drawdown, maintaining a readier posture, while the Russian cuts have been executed in a collapsing empire with troops engaged in little wars on Russia's southern borders and newly-emerged states grasping for a share of the USSR's military spoils. When I remarked that, given the continuing nuclear threat, it was important for our two nations to keep talking, a naval captain in the second row said, in a stage whisper, "Yeah--you talk, we cut."

On a less emotional note, the Russians showed great curiosity about the organization of our military and, especially, in the role of NCOs and relationships between officers, NCOs and junior enlisted service members. The recurring question was, "Whose system is better?" I answered that, for us, our system works better. But each country must develop its own system. Back at the conference, there was some evidence that the Russians "in charge" are beginning to realize that, in this respect, Western solutions cannot simply be transplanted into Russian military soil. Russia must find its own way. On the other hand, some of the more reactionary officers, who call for a complete rejection of all Western experience in favor of a strictly Russian path are at least equally misguided. While Russia must find its own way, that way will inevitably include pieces of the Western experience--adapted for Russian conditions.

At the Frunze Academy, I was reminded of the last West Point class before our Civil War. I knew that the class to which I was speaking was the last in which officers from all of the nations that had formerly composed the Soviet Union would graduate, but the intensity of feeling manifested itself directly when a

Belorussian officer stood up and asked me which system struck me as a better way to form officers, the Russian multi-year Frunze Academy course or our nine-month course at Fort Leavenworth. When I answered that, for us, the nine-month course was preferable because we could not afford to keep our officers away from the practical world for a longer period of time, the officer quickly answered, "Your system is better than theirs," while pointing to his Russian classmates. At this, one of his Russian classmates told the Belorussian to sit down, but the Belorussian would not relinquish the floor. This bitterness also reminded me of my experiences in the newly-independent Baltic states, where the resentment, even hatred, for the Russians is profound.

On the whole, however, the questions at the Frunze Academy were on the "nuts and bolts" level. Interest in the role of the U.S. NCO showed up again in the context of developing NCOs for a professionalized Russian army. One officer wanted to know what techniques U.S. commanders use to factor for combat casualties, while another worried over semantic differences that are clear in the Russian language, but not so clear in English, as to the difference between a true enemy and a mere possible opponent. An officer asked if the U.S. Army would become less effective without the galvanizing Soviet threat. The question about comparing systems came up again, with an officer asking what I thought of the Russian army today. It was a question I found I could not answer with full honesty without offending my hosts. Although we cannot know what the Russian army of tomorrow may be, the Russian army of today is crippled.

A recurring theme in Russia, at the Humanitarian Conference, and at the academy level was the importance of the rule of law for Russia. As regards the military, a jurist at the Frunze Academy took me aside and asked me how much law we teach our officers at our professional schools. After listening to my answer, he spoke of the importance of teaching the law of war and the Geneva Accords more widely in the Russian military, stating that, in the past, only officers selected for the top academies had been given any exposure to this at all. He felt that, overall, the rule of law was not taught, but that the course of future reform depended on it. The Russian military--not just the officers, but the rank-and-file--must be taught what is acceptable behavior on and off the battlefield. The problem of humanizing military behavior is magnified in the Russian Army because neither the society nor the military system teaches spiritual or constitutional values to the soldier. Without such values, the military will inevitably condone if not foster unacceptable behavior in the treatment of civilians, property and prisoners-of-war.

On balance, over the past year, I have found Russian military officers to be honorable men. Where we have learned bits of the truth about our missing service members, those shreds of evidence, documentary or from memory, usually came from serving officers or retired veterans. I believe those officers are willing to help us because we are brothers-in-arms and fellow officers, but, also, because the military has relatively little to hide. I am convinced that the information we seek from Korea, the Cold War, or Vietnam, lies in the files, safes and vaults of the successor organizations of the KGB. The Russian security services have the answers we need.

But how will we get these answers? What will happen to our efforts if Russian General Volkogonov no longer serves as our partner in this search? I have not met anyone with the intellectual capability or clarity of presentation that General Volkogonov possesses, but I am heartened by the meetings I have had with Russian generals who have not shown any apprehension about expressing their faith or speaking the truth. Such officers may be few in the Russian Army today, but I see this as an important beginning.

In my presentations to the Russian military I stressed that one of the most respected and loved generals in the U.S. Army was General Vessey, who had held ranks all the way from private to general. I told my Russian colleagues that General Vessey counseled us that it was hard to be a good soldier in the U.S. Army, but harder to be a good soldier in the Army of the Lord, as the standards were harder to meet.

In the end, it may be those Russians who possess spiritual and moral values who will give us the answers we seek.

This has been a rewarding year for me. I have worked with remarkable soldiers, sailors, airmen and DoD civilians in pursuit of a cause as noble as any I have ever served--seeking our lost comrades-in-arms both for their own sakes and for the sakes of the loved ones they left behind, many of whom have kept the faith

for forty years or longer. The dedication, devotion and, ultimately, the generosity of the POW/MIA family members have been an inspiration to me, and I cannot leave Task Force-Russia without regret that we have not been able to do even more to give them the answers they deserve. I have been taught that the role of a leader is to keep hope alive. The Defense Department that I know today is committed to keeping hope alive on the POW/MIA issue.

To this end, we must persist in our efforts in Moscow and elsewhere in the aftermath of the Soviet empire. In dealing with the Russians, clarity of purpose and perseverance, strength of character and dedication, ultimately pay off. It may be years before we find most of what we seek. But, in parting, let me say that we cannot give up--that we must, above all, keep faith with those who are missing, but not forgotten.

ANNEX B TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA 1 JULY 93 BIWEEKLY REPORT

Task Force Russia Task Organization

TF H (3)

* MG - Director (Army)

* COL- Dpty Dir (Army)

* GS-07 - Secretary (Navy)

CORRES CELL (3)

MAJ - Chief (USAF)

E5/E6 - Clerk (2) (USN)

MOSCOW OFFICE (10)

* COL - Chief (Army)

* LTC - Historian (Army)

* GS-16 - Archivist

* LT -Interpreter (Navy)

* E7 - Admin NCO (AF)

E5 - Admin Clerk (Navy)

* GS-7 - Secretary (LN)

* MAJ - Field Interviewer (3) (USA, DIA, USN)

OPNS OFF

* LTC (DIA)

OPNS NCO

* E7 (Army)

TRANS CELL (4)

* E6 - Translator (Army)

* E6/E5 - Trans (2) (AF)

* E6/E5 - Translator (DIA)

ANAL/PROD (8)

* MAJ - Chief (Army)

* GS-13 - Analyst (3) (Army)

O3/O4 - FAO (2) (AF, USN)

* MAJ - Analyst (DIA)

GS-11 - Anal/Arch (DIA)

COLLECT MGMT (2)

* CPT - Chief (DIA)

E5 - CMF 96 (Army)

DATA BASE SUPPORT (3)

* MAJ - Chief (USAF)

* E6/E5 - Data Spec (2) (USAF)

CHIEF OF SUPPORT (5)

* LCDR - Chief (USN)

GS-12 - RMO (Army)

E7 - Admin NCO (USN)

GS-07 - Budget Clerk

* E7 - Doc NCO (USAF)

ANNEX C TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA 1 JULY 1993 BIWEEKLY REPORT

SUBJECT: Military and Civilian Members of Task Force Russia

DIRECTOR

Loeffke, Bernard MG USA 20 Aug 92 - 30 Jun 93

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Herrington, Stuart A.	COL	USA	15 Jun 92 - 22 May 93
Kloster, Martin G.	LTC	USA	15 May 93 -1 Jan 94

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

LeGro, William E.	GS15	CIV	5 Apr 93 - 5 Apr 94

OPERATIONS OFFICER

Freeman, Robert L.	LTC	USA	7 Dec 92 - 3 Sep 93
Parr, Arthur J.	COL	USA	17 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93
Pusey, Edward S.	COL	USA	1 Aug 92 - 1 Mar 93

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Durham, Edward E.	LTC	USA	22 Jun 92 - 13 Nov 92
Young, Charles M.	LCDR	USN	5 Oct 92 - 1 Jul 93

HISTORIAN/ARCHIVIST

Rogers, Neil F.	MAJ	USAR	5 Oct 92 - 9 Jul 93

ARCHIVIST SUPPORT

Asay, Devin N.	CPT	USAR	17 May 93 - 28 May 93
Farquhar, John T.	MAJ	USAF	24 May 93 - 23 Jun 93
Gallagher, Darel	CPT	USA	10 Jun 93 - 30 Jun 93
Jacobs, Richard	GS13	CIV	1 Oct 92 - 28 May 93
Roser, Robert	LTC	USAFR	14 Jun 93 - 28 Jun 93
Skavinski, Gregory P.	GS11	CIV	13 Feb 93 - 15 May 93

CHIEF, PRODUCTION

Peters, Ralph H. Jr.	MAJ	USAR	25 Jul 92 - 8 Oct 93

ANALYST

Barnes, Richard H.	LTC	USA	10 Dec 92 - 31 Dec 93
Burkett, William B.	MAJ	USA	1 SEP 92 - 31 Dec 93
Childress, Ronald M.	LTC	USAFR	1 Feb 93 - 23 Apr 93
Connell, James G.	GS13	CIV	26 May 92 - 1 Oct 93
Graham, Albert E.	GS13	CIV	13 May 92 - 30 Jun 93
Hindrichs, Werner S.	MAJ	USAF	1 Oct 92 - 23 Sep 93
Huang, Cheng	LTC	USA	27 Apr 93 - 31 Dec 93
Johnson, Peter C.	MAJ	USAR	2 Nov 92 - 15 Jun 93
O'Malley, William	LTC	USA	25 Jul 92 - 29 Jun 93
Poltoratzky, Vladimir	LTC	USAR	19 Oct 92 - 22 Jul 93

ANALYST (Continued)

Saxe, William E.	COL	USA	15 May 92 - 22 Jun 93
Tabach, Gary	LT	USN	4 Sep 92 - 1 Oct 93
Tihomirov, Dimitry L.	LTC	USAF	1 Feb 93 - 30 Sep 93
Thomas, Edward J.F.	COL	USA	1 Jun 93 - 10 Aug 93
Tsouras, Peter G.	GS15	CIV	3 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93
Vivian, Paul H.	GS12	CIV	3 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93
Wright, Elmo C.	GS13	CIV	3 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93

CHIEF, TRANSLATION CELL

Blasser, Danz F.	MSGT	USAF	17 Aug 92 - 9 Aug 93

TRANSLATOR

Eastman, Henry H.	SSG	USAR	31 Jan 93 - 5 Nov 93
Groh, Michael J.	SSG	USAR	5 Oct 92 - 9 Jul 93
Payton, John Richard	SGT	USAF	24 May 93 - 31 Dec 93
Perry, David R.	SSG	USA	17 Aug 92 - 9 Aug 93
Pierce, Linda	SSG	USA	25 May 93 - 23 Nov 93
Siedling, David J.	TSGT	USAF	1 Oct 92 - 18 Jun 93

CHIEF, OPERATIONS SUPPORT

Taylor, Robert E.	MAJ	USAF	30 Sep 92 - 22 Sep 93
Lacewell, Dwayne	CPT	USA	22 Jun 92 - 7 Aug 92

OPERATIONS SUPPORT

Bradburn, Brett A.	YN1	USN	1 Oct 92 - 23 Sep 93
Brown, Cecil F.	MSGT	USAF	12 Aug 92 - 4 Aug 93
Cruz, Angel	YN1	USN	5 Apr 93 - 23 Apr 93
Dinkins, Ebonee E.	YN1	USN	1 Oct 92 - 30 May 93
Durham, Richard	CPO	USN	1 Oct 92 - 15 Feb 93
Joplin, Melissa G.	SPC	USA	22 Jul 92 - 8 Sep 92
McLaren, Thomasema F.	SPC	USA	21 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93
Ponder, Ulyssees	YN1	USN	5 Mar 93 - 4 Nov 93
Richards, Cheryl	YN1	USN	1 Oct 92 - 28 Mar 93
Slade, Jo Ann	SFC	USA	1 Aug 92 - 31 Dec 93
Smith, Ralph G.	MSGT	USAF	8 Feb 93 - 6 Aug 93
Tillman, Kenneth	SFC	USA	15 Jun 92 - 15 Aug 92
Yarbrough, Willie	MSGT	USAF	17 Aug 92 - 11 Feb 93

CHIEF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Berg, Richard T.	MAJ	USAF	27 Aug 92 - 19 Aug 93

COMPUTER PROGRAMMER

Clough, Brian L.	TSGT	USAF	17 Aug 92 - 11 Feb 93
Langmead, Robert A.	SSGT	USAF	18 Feb 93 - 16 Aug 93
Lexa, William C. Jr.	TSGT	USAF	19 Aug 92 - 13 Feb 93
Rivera, Hector M.	TSGT	USAF	25 Feb 93 - 23 Aug 93

ANNEX D TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT FOR 1 JULY 1993

SUBJECT: ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF TASK FORCE RUSSIA SINCE INCEPTION

General: Task Force Russia, with 42 personnel (6 in Pentagon, 28 in Washington, and 8 in Moscow), provides support to the U.S./Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIA affairs to obtain information on unaccounted-for American servicemen on, or who may have been taken to, the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Task Force collects and analyzes information contained in Russian and U.S. archives, in conjunction with information volunteered by Russian citizens or other knowledgeable persons. The Task Force focuses on four wars in the following order of priority: (1) Vietnam, (2) Korea, (3) the Cold War, and (4) World War II. Commission priorities are (1) return of live Americans; (2) recover remains; and (3) obtain information that will lead to the accounting for missing Americans from Vietnam, Korea, the Cold War, and World War II.

Since its activation on 29 June 1992 by directive of the Secretary of Defense, TFR has had significant accomplishments, exemplified by written products, archival searches, interviews, and press releases, as summarized below.

Written products:

- Twenty-four (24) Biweekly Reports, beginning 17 July 1992 to the present, summarize TFR's activities, highlight key documents, and provide direction to future TFR events.

- TFR has received over 7,000 pages of documents from the Russian archives. Over 2,500 pages have been translated. TFR has produced four compendiums of verbatim translations (in July, September, October 92, February 93), which cover over 1,000 documents (including documents released from all Russian archival sources, newspaper articles, and personal letters to TFR from Russian citizens).

- TFR translators served the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in his Alaska meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army in Alaska (Feb 93), provided linguistic support for two additional high level Russian dignitaries visiting the United States, and translated the "1205 document " (which discusses 1205 American POWs in Vietnam in 1972) for former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs John Vessey's briefing to the President of the United States.

- Three analytical reports provided insights into Russian perspectives on the POW/MIA issue, insights into the U.S. POW graves in Sakhalin and southern Kurils, and an analysis of the " 1205 n document.

- A two-volume publication of documents that General Volkogonov gave the Senate Select Committee on 11 Nov 92 is in the final stages of editing prior to publication.

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92).

- Trip to the Ukraine in Jan 93 followed up on report of a possible former U.S. POW.

- Two-month trip to Russia (Nov and Dec 92) supplemented TFR-M staff.

- Discussions with family members resulted in additional information, photographs, and leads for an expanded interview program.

- Answered questions under Freedom of Information Act (two ongoing actions).

- Coordinated with National Archives, CDO, CIA, and State to declassify portions of "Klaus files."

- Worked with DoD PAO and reporters for US News and World Report to ensure accurate story in 15 March 93 issue on Cold War shootdowns.

- Provided computer support to TFR-Moscow.

- Scanned Russian and English language TFR documents to provide historical record of activities.

- Developed pass-on books outlining responsibilities of individual analysts to provide TFR continuity in light of significant personnel turnover.

Advertising: Press releases developed and approved for at least six publications, including: *Army Reserve Magazine; Svoboda; Ukrainian Weekly; Independent Paper from Russia; Nezavesimaya Gazeta; Laiks (Latvian); The Armenian Reporter;* and Russian language newspapers in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, and *Russia Rossiya* and in Moscow in mid-May *(Krasnaya Zvezda).*

As a direct result of advertising, no fewer than 16 citizens of a Baltic country have voluntarily provided additional information pertinent to the U.S. POW/MIA issue. These interviews have resulted in 12 additional leads (callers and letters), continue to be evaluated. Four contacts were also made in Yerevan.

Projected activities:

- Set up 9-day trip to Latvia for 20 - 28 July to conduct interviews, follow up on letters received and interviews already conducted.

- Expand interview program in Russia and republics of the former Soviet Union.

- Expand Russian archival searches to include holdings at Podolsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and St. Petersburg.

- TFR is establishing working relationship with Army Reserve Translators under the Red Train Program, with translators for two week active training, and with Bravo Company, 104th MI Bn, Ft Carson, CO to assist in backlog of document translations as well as provide limited language maintenance training.